Christian Louboutin v. Yves Saint Laurent:  Trademark Use  Stomps Its Red Heels on  Likelihood of Confusion by Vidackovic, Vanja
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology 
& Intellectual Property Law 
Volume 23 
Issue 2 Spring 2013 Article 7 
Christian Louboutin v. Yves Saint Laurent: "Trademark Use" 
Stomps Its Red Heels on "Likelihood of Confusion" 
Vanja Vidackovic 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip 
Recommended Citation 
Vanja Vidackovic, Christian Louboutin v. Yves Saint Laurent: "Trademark Use" Stomps Its Red Heels on 
"Likelihood of Confusion", 23 DePaul J. Art, Tech. & Intell. Prop. L. 463 (2013) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol23/iss2/7 
This Case Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law by an 
authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. For more information, please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
CHRISTIAN LOUBOUTIN V. YVES SAINT
LAURENT: "TRADEMARK USE" STOMPS ITS
RED HEELS ON "LIKELIHOOD OF
CONFUSION"
I. INTRODUCTION
Fashion is an industry and an art form that warrants intellectual
property protection for its aesthetic and economic value.' The
creativity and skill of fashion designers is akin to that of traditional
artists and modem society widely recognizes the creative value of
fashion.2 Yet fashion designs do not enjoy the kind of intellectual
property protection that is widely granted to paintings and
sculptures.3 Because the Copyright Act, which grants protection to
artistic creations,' seldom reaches fashion designs due to its useful
article doctrine, the fashion industry relies mostly on trademark
protection to safeguard its creative expression and economic
investment.5
In one of the latest cases involving the fashion industry's
attempts to secure intellectual property protection, Christian
Louboutin filed suit against Yves Saint Laurent alleging trademark
infringement of its notorious bright red lacquered outsole.6 The
case was decided on appeal in the United States Court of Appeals
1. Danielle E. Gorman, Protecting Single Color Trademarks in Fashion
After Louboutin, 30 CARDOZo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 369, 393 (2012). But cf Kal
Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and
Intellectual Property in Fashion Design, 92 VA. L. REV. 1687, 1718 (2006)
(arguing that lack of intellectual property protection in the fashion industry does
not harm designers and serves the industry's interests).
2. Jeannie Suk, Little Red (Litigious) Shoes, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/22/opinion/sunday/louboutin-and-the-little-
red-litigious-shoes.html? r-0.
3. Gorman, supra note 1, at 394.
4. 17 U.S.C § 102(a) (2006) (copyright protection extends to works of
authorship including literary, musical, dramatic . . . pictorial, graphic, sculptural
... and architectural works).
5. Gorman, supra note 1.
6. Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am., Inc., 778 F. Supp.
2d 445, 449 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
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for the Second Circuit, where the court ruled on the fate of single
color marks in the fashion industry.' Yves Saint Laurent designed
and sold monochromatic, red high-heeled shoes with the bright red
sole that is characteristic of the Louboutin brand.' The district
court found in favor of the defendant, formulating a per-se rule
against the trademark of single colors in the fashion industry, and
called for cancellation of the Louboutin mark.9  Louboutin
appealed the decision and the Second Circuit overturned the
district court's finding, reasoning that colors can enjoy trademark
protection when they have acquired secondary meaning.'o
This Note argues that single colors in the fashion industry
should be afforded trademark protection in accordance with the
Supreme Court's decision in Qualitex and that the Second Circuit
correctly reinstated the Louboutin Red Sole Mark. However, the
Second Circuit erred in applying the trademark-use doctrine as a
threshold issue in order to avoid engaging in a likelihood of
confusion analysis. Louboutin, as owner of the Red Sole Mark,
has the right to seek protection against potential infringers whose
products might be confusingly similar. Such a finding requires the
court to engage in a likelihood of confusion analysis. Presented
with this fact specific inquiry on remand, the district court could
have found in favor of Louboutin. Part II of this Note will
introduce the background on trademark law in the United States,
and more specifically, trademark protection of single color marks
and the trademark-use doctrine. Part III will introduce the
Christian Louboutin v. Yves Saint Laurent case and explain the
findings of the district court and the decision of the Second
Circuit. Part IV of the Note will discuss the Second Circuit's
analysis of the Louboutin Mark, its application of the aesthetic
functionality doctrine and the secondary meaning it proved in
order to earn trademark protection. Finally, Part IV will analyze
the Second Circuit's error in applying the trademark-use doctrine
7. Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am., Inc., 696 F.3d 206,
226 (2d Cir. 2012).
8. Louboutin, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 449.
9. Id at 458.
10. Louboutin, 696 F.3d at 226.
464
2
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 23, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 7
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol23/iss2/7
CHRISTIAN LOUBOUTIN
to the Louboutin case and the likely outcome of a fact specific
infringement analysis of the Red Sole Mark.
II. BACKGROUND
To understand how the Second Circuit reached its decision it is
necessary to understand the general background of trademark law
and the policy reasons behind the protection it grants to mark
owners. Because the court correctly concluded that the doctrine of
aesthetic functionality did not undermine trademark rights in the
Red Sole Mark, an understanding of functionality with respect to
single color marks is important. Finally, keeping in mind
trademark law's objectives and the policy reasons for furthering its
goals, the court's decision raises a question as to the role of the
trademark-use doctrine in assessing infringement cases.
Likelihood of confusion, as the most important analysis in
trademark infringement cases, is undermined by the court's
reliance on aesthetic functionality and the trademark-use doctrine.
Although the court's decision with respect to functionality left
ample room for likelihood of confusion analysis, the court
completely usurped the factual findings of likelihood of confusion
by relying on the trademark-use doctrine as a way to dismiss
Louboutin's infringement case.
A. Trademark Law in the U.S.
A trademark is a "any word, name, symbol, or device, or any
combination thereof [used].. .to identify and distinguish [goods or
services] from those manufactured or sold by others and to
indicate the source of the goods [or services]."" Trademarks tell
the public about the source and quality of a certain product bearing
a specific mark. 2 Trademarks also embody a company's goodwill,
the positive association that a consumer gives to the company and
its products and the likelihood that the customer will be back in the
11. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006).
12. 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION §3.2 (4th ed. 2009).
2013] 465
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future." Non-deceptive practices "reduce consumer search costs,
improve economic efficiency, and protect producers'
investments." 4  Therefore, protecting a company's mark from
infringement benefits not only the company but also the consumers
who purchase the company's products.
Federal trademark law is codified by the Trademark Act of
1946, commonly known as the Lanham Act." The Lanham Act
allows for registration of trademarks that have become distinctive
of the applicant's goods in commerce,16 provided that the mark
does not fall within any of the exceptions enumerated in the
statute." In order to register a mark, an applicant has to prove that
the mark is either inherently distinctive or has acquired
distinctiveness, that it is used in commerce, identifies its source
and is non-functional." Although federal registration gives the
trademark prima facie validityl9 and protection as of the date of
application, marks do not have to be registered in order to gain
protection under the Act.20 Unregistered trademarks receive
common law trademark rights and protection under Section 43(a)
of the Lanham Act, which forbids false designations of origin and
false descriptions.2 1 Obtaining registration of a mark from the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office provides potential competitors with
notice as to the rights of the registrant and may make the mark
incontestable after five years of continuous use.22
13. Jessica A.E. McKinney, Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc.: A Conscious
Analytical Shift, 95 IOWA L. REv. 281, 286 (2009); Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar
Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985).
14. McKinney, supra note 13, at 316.
15. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2006).
16. See id. § 1052(f).
17. See id. § 1052(a) - (e) (for example, no trademark protection is granted
to immoral, deceptive or scandalous matter, to goods that comprise a country's
flag, or the name, portrait, or signature of an individual without his consent, or
to a mark which so closely resembles a registered trademark or a mark already
in use in the United States that it is likely to cause confusion).
18. See id. § 1127; see also Innwood Labs. Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S.
844, 850, n. 10 (1982).
19. See id. § 1065.
20. See id. § 1125.
21. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125.
22. See id. § 1065.
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Since its passage in 1946, the Lanham Act has vastly broadened
its reach. Over the years, it has become a source of intellectual
property protection for an increasing variety of marks, including
fashion designs.23 Courts have recognized the registration of
shapes, sounds, moving images and smells as marks.24 Because of
the wide scope of the Lanham Act and the few restrictions it places
on registration of trademarks, the Supreme Court in Qualitex v.
Jacobson Prods. Co. has extended trademark protection to single
colors, provided that they meet the general trademark criteria.25
B. Aesthetic Functionality and Single Colors as Trademarks
Until federal courts began addressing the issue in 1985, it was
accepted among lower courts that trademark protection could not
be extended to single colors because they could never meet the
requisite distinctiveness standard.26 As a result, colors were only
protectable as part of a design, symbol or pattern.27 The beginning
of the modern trajectory of single color protection under trademark
law began in 1985, when the Federal Circuit in In re Owens-
Corning Fiberglass Corp. found that the pink color of the glass
insulation could enjoy trademark protection because it was not
functional.28 For ten years following the court's decision in
23. Kenneth L. Port, The Expansion Trajectory: Trademark Jurisprudence
in the Modern Age, 92 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 474, 476 (2010).
24. For example, U.S. Broadcaster NBC has trademarked the sound of the
chime used to identify a station break and 2 0 th Century Fox Film Corporation
has registered a trademark for its logo with floodlights trailing across the sky.
The Mark Comprises the Musical Notes G, E, C, Played on Chimes,
Registration No. 916,522. See also In re Clarke, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1238 (BNA)
(T.T.A.B. 1990) (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Appeal Board approved the
trademark of a fragrance for thread and embroidery yam).
25. See Qualitex v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 162 (1995).
26. Gorman, supra note 1, at 374.
27. Stephen J. Newman, Kill the "Mere Color" Rule: Equal Protection for
Color under the Lanham Act, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1595, 1604 (1994).
28. In re Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 774 F.2d 1116, 1128 (Fed. Cir.
1985).
2013] 467
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Owens-Corning, there was inconsistency among circuits in the
treatment of single colors under the Lanham Act.29
In 1995, the Supreme Court ruled on the issue of single color
trademarks in Qualitex v. Jacobson Prods. Co. 30 Qualitex and
Jacobson were rivals in the business of producing and selling dry
cleaning pads for presses.3 ' In 1991, Qualitex obtained trademark
registration of the green-gold color that Jacobson had been using
on its dry cleaning pads since 1989.32 Because Qualitex had been
using that color on its pads since the 1950s, it filed a trademark
infringement suit against Jacobson. In his opinion, Justice Breyer
articulated that "[w]e cannot find in the basic objectives of
trademark law any obvious theoretical objection to the use of color
alone as a trademark, where that color has attained 'secondary
meaning' and therefore identifies and distinguishes a particular
brand."34 He further elaborated that the functionality doctrine does
not create an absolute bar to the use of a single color as a mark
because color can serve purely as a symbol and have no further use
or purpose.
Qualitex has clearly extended trademark protection to single
colors, but single colors used in the fashion industry present
additional complications, which the Court in Qualitex
acknowledged. 36  Additional, case specific analysis is required
where a color satisfies "the noble instinct for giving the right touch
of beauty to common and necessary things.""
The functionality doctrine serves as an affirmative defense to a
trademark infringement claim. Its goal is to prevent producers
29. See Master Distribs. v. Pako Corp., 986 F.2d 219, 225 (8th Cir. 1993)
(holding that colors that meet the trademark requirements warrant protection).
But see NutraSweet Co. v. Stadt Corp., 917 F.2d 1024, 1027 (7th Cir. 1990)
(holding that color can be trademarked only in connection with a symbol or
design).
30. Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 161.
31. Id
32. Id
33. Id
34. Id at 163.
35. Id at 165.
36. Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 170.
37. Id
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from gaining a monopoly over a product feature that is useful and
that allows the producer to manufacture at a cost that is lower than
its competitors' production cost." Aesthetic functionality, more
specifically, is a defense used when the aesthetic feature of a
product is itself the mark that the company is seeking to protect.39
The test for aesthetic functionality, as outlined in Qualitex, asks
whether granting trademark protection to the design feature would
put competitors at a significant non-reputation-related
disadvantage.40
The Qualitex Court narrowed the scope of the aesthetic
functionality doctrine by adopting the definition presented in the
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition, which says that "a
design is functional because of its aesthetic value only if it confers
a significant benefit that cannot practically be duplicated by the
use of alternative designs."4' Under this definition, the focus of the
analysis is not the aesthetic and expressive purpose of the design
but the availability of alternative designs. The doctrine is based
upon the premise that the visual appeal of a trademark must be free
for all to imitate because it is an essential ingredient in the
commercial success of a product, and restricting its use would
hinder fair competition within the marketplace.4 2
As the definition and application of the aesthetic functionality
doctrine has changed over time, it has become a topic of debate
among scholars in the field. Thomas McCarthy goes so far as to
say that the doctrine of aesthetic functionality is an oxymoron and
"an unwarranted expansion of the utilitarian functionality policy,
carrying it far outside the . . . rationale that justifies the policy."4 3
McCarthy argues that the doctrine undermines trademark
protection because it overrides factual findings of likelihood of
confusion.44 McCarthy suggests that the focus should not be on
aesthetic functionality but rather a simple inquiry into whether a
38. Gorman, supra note 1, at 382-83.
39. Louboutin, 696 F.3d at 219-20.
40. Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 165 (citing Innwood, 456 U.S. at 850, n. 10).
41. RESTATEMENT(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 17, cmt. c (1995).
42. Gorman, supra note 1, at 390.
43. MCCARTHY,supra note 12 at §7.81.
44. Id.
2013] 469
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design is perceived by customers as a trademark rather than merely
ornamental.4 5 Under a backdrop of uncertainty in the realm of
trademark protection for colors in fashion designs, the Louboutin
court addressed the validity and scope of the Red Sole Mark.
C. Trademark-Use Doctrine
The trademark-use doctrine has been a hotly debated subject
among scholars in the field of intellectual property.46 Many
experts disagree not only on the definition of the doctrine but also
its application within the context of infringement analysis.47
Trademark law seeks to foster competition by preventing
consumer confusion about the source of products in the
marketplace.4 8 It protects the interest of consumers, of producers
who invested in the quality of their product, and of potential
competitors.49 Proponents of the trademark-use doctrine claim that
it tailors the infringement analysis "to ensure that it effectively
serves its purpose - preventing interference with customers' ability
to rely on marks for product information - without interfering
unduly with the free flow of useful marketplace information to
consumers."50
A definitive and widely agreed upon definition of the trademark-
use doctrine has not been articulated by judges or scholars but in
general terms, the doctrine states that in order to be infringing, the
use of a mark must be a source-designating use and that a
threshold-use determination subordinates the inquiry into
likelihood of confusion." Infringing trademark use under the
doctrine must lead the public to believe that the source of the
45. Id.
46. Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Grounding Trademark Law
Through Trademark Use, 92 IOWA L. REv. 1669, 1670 (2007).
47. Id.
48. MCCARTHY, supra note 12 at §3.5 (citing Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402
F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1968)).
49. Id.
50. Margreth Barrett, Internet Trademark Suits and the Demise of
"Trademark Use, " 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 371, 378-79 (2006).
51. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 46, at 1682.
470
8
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 23, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 7
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol23/iss2/7
CHRISTIAN LOUBOUTIN
product in question is the defendant, not the plaintiff.5 2 Proponents
of the trademark-use doctrine believe that the doctrine is "designed
to deliberately short-circuit claims of trademark infringement by
avoiding the messiness of the confusion analysis - particularly its
fact-specificity, which is said to make confusion analysis 'ill-
suited to early resolution of lawsuits.' 53
In the context of an infringement case, courts typically apply the
trademark-use doctrine as a threshold issue in order to determine
first and foremost whether the defendant's conduct constitutes use
of the plaintiff's mark.54 If the court is able to answer that question
in the affirmative, it then engages in a likelihood of confusion
analysis to determine whether the defendant's conduct constitutes
infringement." If, however, the court determines that the
defendant's conduct does not constitute use of the plaintiff's mark,
as the court in Louboutin did, the inquiry ends and no trademark
infringement exists.56 Scholars such as Stacey Dogan and Mark
Lemley argue that a contextual inquiry into the likelihood of
confusion is meaningless unless the defendant is actually using the
mark on its own product." Graeme Dinwoodie and Mark Janis, on
the other hand, find that the doctrine is "a clumsy stratagem for
rendering a priori judgments without the benefit of a contextual
inquiry."" According to them, "indiscriminate immunity based on
a formal notion of trademark use should not undermine confusion
as the lodestar of trademark liability. Confusion should remain a
central factor in assessing the context in which consumers
experience marks.""
52. Barrett, supra note 50, at 375.
53. Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, Lessons from the Trademark
Use Debate, 92 IOWA L. REv. 1703, 1713 (2007).
54. McKinney, supra note 13, at 289.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 46, at 1678-79.
58. Dinwoodie & Janis, supra note 53, at 1714.
59. Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, Confusion Over Use:
Contextualism in Trademark Law, 92 IOWA L. REv. 1597, 1662 (2007).
2013] 471
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Courts have differed in their application of the trademark-use
doctrine in the context of infringement analysis.6 o However, with
its decision in Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., the Second Circuit
shifted away from the strict threshold analysis of "trademark use"
for the purpose of determining infringement toward a more
contextual fact-specific analysis advocated by scholars such as
Dinwoodie and Janis.61
In Rescuecom, a computer repair company sued Google for
trademark infringement, alleging that Google sold the Rescuecom
trademark as a keyword to competitors who purchased advertising
space from Google and made their own advertisements appear
every time a user searched for the word "Rescuecom. "62 Because
the advertisements were not clearly distinguishable from the
search results, Rescuecom argued that they were likely to cause
confusion among consumers who may associate a competitor's
advertisement with Rescuecom.1
Although the Second Circuit reversed the district court's
dismissal of Rescuecom's complaint, it did not engage in the strict
step-by-step infringement analysis that requires determination of
(1) use (2) in commerce, and (3) likelihood of confusion.64 Instead
of analyzing the threshold "use" determination under the doctrine
before reaching a discussion of the likelihood of confusion, the
Court noted that an infringer's use of a mark cannot escape
liability irrespective of how likely the use is to cause confusion in
the marketplace. 65 The court attached an appendix to its decision
further asserting its opinion that Congress did not intend to apply
the Lanham Act's definition of "use in commerce" in the context
of infringement analysis to limit the type of conduct that could
60. See 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.Com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400, 411-12 (2d
Cir. 2005) (applying a strict interpretation of the trademark-use doctrine). But
see Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1024
(9th Cir. 2004) (failing to expressly acknowledge or apply the trademark-use
doctrine).
61. Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 562 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2009).
62. Id. at 125.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 131.
65. McKinney, supra note 13, at 305.
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result in liability."6 However, the Court acknowledged that such an
interpretation was reasonable and was previously adopted by the
Second Circuit.67 As a result, the court ultimately left the
trademark-use doctrine intact. However, its decision represents a
shift away from the threshold "use" analysis and toward an
analysis of "use" that includes considerations of likelihood of
confusion."
III. CHRISTIAN LoUBOUTIN v. YVES SAINT LAURENT AMERICA
HOLDINGS, INC.
A. Factual Background
Iconic French footwear designer Christian Louboutin
("Louboutin") is known around the world for the bright red
lacquered outsole that identifies all his high heel designs.69
Louboutin brought action against its competitor Yves Saint
Laurent ("YSL") alleging that YSL violated the Lanham Act by
producing and selling high-heeled shoes with red lacquered
outsoles.o
Since 1992, Louboutin has been making high-heeled women's
shoes that have come to be known in the world of high fashion by
their bright red, lacquered outsoles.n Over the years, Louboutin
built a brand around the red sole and invested a considerable
amount of capital to earn the reputation and notoriety it holds
today.72 The bright red outsole became synonymous with the
66. Id.
67. Rescuecom, 562 F.3d at 131 (citing 1-800 Contacts, 414 F.3d at 408).
68. McKinney, supra note 13, at 304-05 ("The analysis ... departed from
prior Second Circuit decisions by actually entertaining considerations of
confusion during its threshold use analysis ... Product placement in a brick-
and-mortar store 'escapes liability because it does not cause a likelihood of
confusion [,]. . .not by reason of an absence of' a particular type of use."
(quoting Rescuecom, 562 F.3d at 130)).
69. Louboutin, F. Supp. 2d at 447-48.
70. Id. at 449.
71. Id. at 447.
72. Id.
2013] 473
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Louboutin name.73 In January 2008, the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office granted Louboutin a trademark that consisted of
a red lacquered sole on footwear (the "Red Sole Mark").74 In
2011, YSL began marketing and selling a line of monochrome
shoes in a series of colors including red." The all-red YSL high-
heeled shoes had a red insole, heel, upper and, of course, a red
outsole."
B. District Court Decision
In April, 2011 Louboutin filed an action in the Southern District
of New York asserting claims under the Lanham Act for trademark
infringement and counterfeiting, false designation of origin and
unfair competition, and trademark dilution." The company sought
further relief under New York state law for trademark
infringement, trademark dilution, unfair competition and unlawful
deceptive acts and practices. YSL in turn asserted counterclaims
seeking cancellation of the Red Sole Mark and damages for
tortious interference with business relations and unfair
competition, claiming that the Red Sole Mark is ornamental and
functional."
The district court held that single color trademarks in the fashion
industry are likely invalid because color is inherently functional
and ornamental." The district court reasoned that granting
trademark protection to single colors would restrain artistic
freedom and fair competition in a creative industry that is largely
dependent on color." Louboutin filed an appeal arguing that the
district court erred in its findings.
73. Id. at 447-48.
74. Id at 448.
75. Louboutin, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 449.
76. Louboutin, 696 F.3d at 213.
77. Louboutin, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 449.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id at 453.
474
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C. Second Circuit Opinion
On September 5, 2012 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit published a decision that amounted to a victory
for both parties. In its opinion, the Second Circuit affirmed in part
and reversed in part the lower court's decision, holding that
Louboutin's trademark is valid but should be limited in scope and
that YSL's design was not a use of Louboutin's narrowed mark.12
Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Qualitex, the Second
Circuit rejected the lower court's decision that single colors cannot
enjoy trademark protection in the fashion industry." In rejecting
this per se rule of functionality, the court acknowledged that
Louboutin's Red Sole Mark is eligible for protection because it has
acquired the requisite distinctiveness as a red outsole that contrasts
with the remainder of the shoe.84 Louboutin was able to prove that
the red outsole has acquired secondary meaning as a symbol that
the public associates with the Louboutin brand, but only insofar as
the red sole is not part of a monochromatic design because "it is
the contrast between the sole and the upper that causes the sole to
'pop,' and to distinguish its creator."" Having officially modified
the scope of Louboutin's Red Sole Mark, the court held that YSL's
monochromatic design was not a use of that Red Sole Mark." The
court stopped short of engaging in trademark infringement analysis
concluding that Louboutin could keep its Red Sole Mark and YSL
could continue to market and sell its monochromatic shoes.
Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part the
order of the district court and remanded for further proceedings
with respect to YSL's counterclaims."
82. Louboutin, 696 F.3d at 229.
83. Id. at 212.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 227.
86. Id. at 228.
87. Id. at 228.
88. Louboutin, 696 F.3d at 229.
20 13 ] 475
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IV. ANALYSIS
The Second Circuit's decision in Louboutin seals the fate of
single color marks within the fashion industry. Consistent with
one of the main gQals of trademark law, it allows Louboutin to
protect its investment in reputation and keep its trademark of the
iconic red outsole. At the same time, however, the narrowed
trademark allows YSL to produce and market its monochrome red
shoes despite the possible consumer confusion as to the source of
the luxury high heels.
Part A of this section will argue that the Second Circuit's
reversal of the district court's decision to adopt a per-se rule
against granting trademark protection to single colors was proper.
Part B will discuss the Second Circuit's error in applying the
threshold-use determination and Part C will engage in a likelihood
of confusion analysis in order to show that YSL's red sole on its
monochromatic shoes could be confusingly similar to Louboutin's
trademarked red sole.
A. The Red Sole Mark Survives
The Second Circuit's decision to grant Louboutin its Red Sole
Mark was supported by precedent and its decision to limit the
scope of the mark was appropriate given the facts in the record.
The court rightly shied away from setting a precedent that single
colors are inherently functional and therefore, never subject to
trademark protection in the fashion industry. This finding was in
line with the Supreme Court's decision in Qualitex." The Qualitex
Court refused to adopt a per-se rule denying trademark protection
for colors holding that consumers may come to associate a color
on a product with a particular brand and that color may therefore
act as a mark.90 By staying in line with the precedent set in
Qualitex, this court appropriately refused to carve out a specific
89. See Qualitex v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159 (1995).
90. Id. at 170.
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exception for products that enter the marketplace because of their
desirability and not their functionality."
In the fashion industry, trademark law should first and foremost
protect consumers by reducing their search costs and producers by
allowing them to reap the benefits of their financial investments.
Simply because a mark is aesthetically appealing, like a red
outsole on a high-heeled shoe, it does not mean that it cannot act
as an indicator of source and quality and thus, warrant protection
as a trademark.9 2 The desirability of a color does not undermine its
validity as a trademark because an infinite number of colors exist
for others to use, leaving the marketplace open to competition
while at the same time protecting innovation." In fact, the court in
Louboutin appropriately underscored the Second Circuit's prior
holding that aesthetic functionality "bars protection of a mark that
is 'necessary to compete in the relevant market."' 9 4
In its application of the aesthetic functionality doctrine, the
district court in Louboutin did not consider the narrower definition
set forth in Qualitex but rather reverted back to a broad
understanding of the doctrine finding that the red sole functions to
"attract, to reference, to stand out, to blend in, to beautify, to
endow with sex appealFalse"" The district court did not examine
the availability of alternative designs and how the Red Sole Mark
would affect fair competition in the marketplace. Instead of asking
whether companies competing in the luxury footwear market need
to be able to use the color red on their outsoles in order to
effectively compete, the district court broadly asked whether
Louboutin should be entitled to claim the color red in general.9 6
Under this broad understanding of aesthetic functionality, fashion
designs could never garner trademark protection because they all
91. Katie M. Morton, "Sole" Searching: Christian Louboutin's Fight
Against Yves Saint Laurent - And The Aesthetic Functionality Doctrine - To
Own The Color Red, 12 WAKE FOREST J. Bus. & INTELL. PROP, L. 293, 306
(2012).
92. Id. at 305.
93. Id.
94. Louboutin, 696 F.3d at 221 (citing Villeroy & Boch Keramische Werke
K.G. v. THC Sys., Inc., 999 F.2d 619, 622 (2d Cir. 1993)).
95. Gorman, supra note 1, at 384.
96. Id. at 385.
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have a visual appeal and their restriction under trademark law
would adversely affect free competition.17
The Second Circuit properly rejected the district court's broad
application of the aesthetic functionality doctrine finding the color
red, as used on the outsole of a shoe, is not necessary for other
designers to compete in the market of luxury high-heeled shoes.
In fact, YSL's use of a blue, yellow or green outsole in the design
and marketing of its monochromatic shoe was not at issue and it
still allowed the company to create designs that would compete in
the market of high-end women's shoes. In making their
determination under the aesthetic functionality test, "courts must
carefully weigh the 'competitive benefits of protecting the source-
identifying aspects' of a mark against the 'competitive costs of
precluding competitors from using the feature.""' As the
Louboutin court appropriately pointed out, the functionality
defense does not guarantee a competitor the greatest range for his
creative outlet, but only the ability to fairly compete within a given
market.99
The aesthetic functionality doctrine does not even need to be
applied in this case in order to reach a fair finding. As McCarthy
argues in his treatise on trademarks, the focus should not be on
aesthetic functionality.'o The question in the Louboutin case
should be whether the red sole is purely ornamental or something
that consumers perceive as a mark of the Louboutin brand. Under
this framework, Louboutin should be given the chance to show
that the red sole on its high heels is a widely recognized mark that
identifies the source of the product rather than a simple ornamental
feature.
The Supreme Court precedent set forth in Qualitex requires a
fact-based inquiry into the nature of the trademark and cannot be
interpreted to allow for the development of a per-se, industry
specific rule. The Louboutin court followed this holding in
rejecting the district court's cancellation of the Red Sole Mark and
97. Id.
98. Louboutin, 696 F.3d at 222 (citing Fabrication Enters., Inc. v. Hygenic
Corp., 64 F.3d 53, 59 (2d Cir. 1995)).
99. Louboutin, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 452-53.
100. McCARTHY, supra note 12 at §7.81.
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engaged in an analysis of whether the mark merits protection.'0'
The court concluded that the Louboutin mark has acquired
secondary meaning and thus, the requisite distinctiveness to merit
protection under the Lanham Act.'02 In its analysis the court said
that although a color is almost never inherently distinctive, it can
acquire secondary meaning when it "becomes a symbol, 'the
primary significance' of which is 'to identify the source of the
product rather than the product itself.""0 3 In the case of
Louboutin's mark, the red outsole does just that. It identifies the
shoe as being designed and manufactured by Christian Louboutin
and it sets an expectation of quality among consumers who
participate in that marketplace.
In determining secondary meaning, the court looks to factors
such as "(1) advertising expenditures, (2) consumer studies linking
the mark to a source, (3) unsolicited media coverage of the
product, (4) sales success, (5) attempts to plagiarize the mark, and
(6) length and exclusivity of the mark's use."" In analyzing these
factors, the court correctly found that Louboutin invested a great
amount of money and effort into building good will and promoting
its brand with a signature red outsole. In fact, the red outsole is the
center of much media attention among the rich and famous and has
a high level of notoriety in those circles.' 5 However, the court
found that based on the consumer surveys and factual findings
made by the district court, "the lacquered red outsole, as applied to
a shoe with an 'upper' of a different color, has 'come to identify
and distinguish' the Louboutin brand, and is therefore a distinctive
symbol that qualifies for trademark protection."' 06
In performing its "secondary meaning" analysis the court
concluded based on the facts that the red sole's secondary meaning
rested solely in its contrast with the upper, heel and insole.
Louboutin submitted hundreds of pictures of its shoes for the
record and only four of them were monochrome red. Moreover,
101. Louboutin, 696 F.3d at 225.
102. Id. at 227.
103. Id. at 226 (citing Innwood, 456 U.S. at 851 n. 11).
104. Id.
105. Louboutin, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 447-48.
106. Louboutin, 696 F.3d at 227 (emphasis added).
20 13] 479
17
Vidackovic: Christian Louboutin v. Yves Saint Laurent: "Trademark Use" Stomps
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DEPA UL J. ART, TECH & IP LAW [Vol. XXIII:463
surveys showed that consumers who saw a red monochrome shoe
and misidentified it as Louboutin's did so because of the red
outsole, not because of its general red color.'"7 In light of this
evidence, the Court limited the Red Sole Mark.
B. The Trademark-Use Doctrine Survives
Much to Louboutin's chagrin, the court cut its analysis short. In
its opinion, the Second Circuit stated that modification of the Red
Sole Mark disposes of all claims brought by the two companies
because "the red sole on YSL's monochrome shoes is neither a use
of, nor confusingly similar to, the Red Sole Mark."'os Despite the
Second Circuit's holding in Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc. only
three years before, when the Louboutin court was presented with a
similar question, it revived the threshold-use determination
analysis and opted to end the inquiry before engaging in a
likelihood-of-confusion analysis. However, the court's application
of the trademark-use doctrine in Louboutin was misplaced given
that the theory itself is flawed and the Second Circuit shifted away
from the threshold-use determination in its decision in
Rescuecom. '09
In their article, Dinwoodie and Janis present strong arguments
against the application of the trademark-use doctrine. They reject
the theory on two grounds."o It is too malleable because it often
becomes a proxy for the application of other doctrines needed to
resolve the infringement issue."' At the same time, when strictly
applied, the theory becomes too restrictive to be useful in the
resolution of a wide range of trademark disputes."2 In rejecting
the trademark use theory, Dinwoodie and Janis argue that
trademark use is not grounded in the statutory language of the
Lanham Act and it is inconsistent with the major goals of
trademark law.
107. Id. at 228.
108. Id.
109. Rescuecom, 562 F. 3d at 123.
110. Dinwoodie & Janis, supra note 59, at 1662.
111. Id.
112. Id.
480
18
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 23, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 7
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol23/iss2/7
CHRISTIAN LOUBOUTIN
Proponents of the doctrine, such as Margreth Barrett, find
support for the trademark-use doctrine in the definition of "use in
commerce" under section 45 of the Lanham Act, and argue that the
definition was intended to apply in connection with the registration
of a trademark and in the context of infringement analysis."'
However, Dinwoodie and Janis point to a discrepancy in the
trademark registration and infringement provisions of the Act to
show that the definition of "use in commerce" under section 45
(acquisition of trademark rights) may not apply to trademark
infringement cases under section 32." Section 32 contemplates
that the use of a mark in advertising might lead to liability under
the Act, whereas the definition in section 45 provides that
advertising of a good is not sufficient to acquire trademark
rights.' 5
Other scholars, such as Dogan and Lemley, believe that the
trademark-use doctrine is a common law principle that is not
specifically codified in the Lanham Act but is nonetheless
implicitly incorporated therein."' As Dinwoodie and Janis aptly
point out, such an interpretation would have to be supported both
by evidence that there was a common law trademark-use doctrine
and that since then, there have been no developments in the law
that would negate the theory."' However, even if the former
assertion can be supported, there are provisions in the Lanham Act
that are at odds with the application of a threshold trademark use
analysis."' Applying the trademark-use doctrine as a dispositive
threshold issue would render inapplicable section 33(b)(4) of the
Act, which provides defenses to infringement for a good faith use,
otherwise than as a mark, in order to describe a good or service.11
The goal of trademark law is to identify the source of a product
in order to avoid confusion and reduce search costs for consumers,
while at the same time rewarding producers for their financial
113. Barrett, supra note 50, at 383 (discussing 15 U.S.C. § 1127).
114. Dinwoodie & Janis, supra note 59, at 1611 (citing Barrett, supra note
50, at 383).
115. Id (discussing 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1127).
116. Id. at 1617
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4).
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investment and goodwill.120 The trademark-use doctrine, however,
does not promote these goals because its application precludes the
likelihood of confusion analysis that is so central to trademark law.
"Since the presence or absence of consumer confusion impacts
trademark law's end goals, allowing courts to analyze confusion is
a necessary predicate to determining whether particular conduct
promotes or hinders trademark law's central objectives." 2 ' Non-
confusing practices reduce consumer search costs, improve
economic efficiency and protect producers' investments.122
As the record clearly showed, Louboutin made substantial
monetary investments building a brand and good will that centers
around its signature Red Sole Mark.'23 Consumers should be able
to know that when they see a red sole, it will bear the Louboutin
name and the quality that comes along with it. Further, Louboutin
should be able to profit from the name and reputation that it built
through a guarantee that consumers who want to be seen wearing a
red-soled shoe will purchase a Louboutin product.
While the trademark-use doctrine can be too restrictive by
allowing courts to dispose of infringement cases without engaging
in fact specific analysis, it can also be so malleable as to become
ineffective. According to Dinwoodie and Janis, not only should
courts engage in likelihood of confusion analyses regardless of the
use requirement, it is the case that most courts do.'24 Dinwoodie
and Janis refer to recent U.S. cases to show that the trademark use
requirement is difficult to detach from the confusion issue.125 The
120. MCCARTHY, supra note 12 at § 3.5.
121. McKinney, supra note 13, at 316.
122. Id.
123. Louboutin, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 447.
124. Dinwoodie & Janis, supra note 59, at 1649.
125. Id., (citing Interactive Prods. Corp. v. a2z Mobile Office Solutions,
Inc., 326 F.3d 687, 695 (6th Cir. 2003) (finding that defendant's use of
plaintiffs mark in the post-domain name path of URL did not require a
likelihood of confusion analysis because it was non-trademark use that did not
identify the source of the product); Bosley Med. Inst. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672,
676-77 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding that defendant did not infringe plaintiffs mark
when using it in its domain name because the Lanham Act's infringement
provision has a trademark use requirement, insisting that the defendant's use be
a "use in commerce.").
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doctrine "is so malleable that it can readily morph into any form
that may suit judges' predispositions." 26 Although the Louboutin
court shied away from engaging in this analysis, most courts, like
the court in Rescuecom, inevitably address the issue of likelihood
of confusion when discussing trademark use and the "analysis of
use [becomes] in effect an assessment of confusion conducted
without any rigor." 27 The Louboutin court should have followed
this trend and taken advantage of the flexibility of the use
requirement instead of applying it as a dispositive issue.
Proponents of the doctrine advocate that its application provides
more certainty and decreases the costs of litigation.128 They claim
that applying the likelihood-of-confusion test does not promote
early resolution of lawsuits and leads to prolonged and expensive
litigation.129 However, as we have seen, the doctrine is often used
as a proxy for other factors, such as confusion.'30 Moreover, in
cases such as Louboutin, where the application of the doctrine does
in fact lower the cost of litigation, it does so at the expense of
promoting goals that are at the very core of trademark law. In the
framework of trademark infringement analysis,
[c]ontext matters. Analysis of confusion is
inherently contextual, while trademark use, if it is
to achieve the goals set for it by its proponents, is a
formalistic monolith. A contextual analysis, of
course, is somewhat messier, as context requires
parties to develop a greater range of facts. But that
is what allows trademark law to adapt and deal
comprehensively with the range of commercial
settings to which it applies in the modem
economy. "'
126. Dinwoodie & Janis, supra note 59, at 1650.
127. Id. at 1649.
128. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 46, at 1696.
129. Id. at 1695.
130. Dinwoodie & Janis, supra note 53, at 1714.
131. Dinwoodie & Janis, supra note 59, at 1658.
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A contextual approach that allows courts to engage in fact
specific analysis promotes the development of trademark law
through an analysis of competing rationales and a balancing of
possible defenses.'32 Courts should be more willing to undertake
this task as it confers a benefit on trademark law in general and on
the parties involved on a case-by-case basis.
Despite the flaws of the trademark-use doctrine, the Rescuecom
court did not completely do away with the "use" determination
requirement. Rather, it shifted away from a strict threshold
analysis that does not take into consideration likelihood of
confusion and applied the doctrine in its malleable form.'33 The
court in Louboutin should have engaged in a likelihood of
confusion analysis before disposing of all claims simply under the
premise that YSL's red monochrome shoe did not constitute use.134
In fact, the court even made reference to consumer surveys that
were submitted by Louboutin showing that some consumers
identified the YSL-made red monochrome shoe as a Louboutin
product because of the red sole.' 5 The court referred to these
surveys and used them as evidence to show that the Red Sole Mark
should be limited to a red sole that contrasts with the rest of the
shoe.136  However, the court then refrained from using this
evidence as proof that the use of a red sole in a monochrome shoe
causes confusion among consumers as to the source of the product.
In the fashion industry, and more specifically in the highly
competitive women's luxury footwear market, where the
consumers' main focus is the product's brand name, likelihood of
confusion should play a major role in infringement analysis.
The Second Circuit's decision to grant Louboutin its Red Sole
Mark but narrow its scope should not preclude the analysis of the
likelihood of confusion. Whether the YSL shoe causes confusion
among consumers as to the source of the good is a separate issue
from whether Louboutin has a valid trademark that consists of a
red sole or a valid trademark that consists of a contrasting red sole.
132. Id. at 1662.
133. See sources cited supra note 68 and accompanying text.
134. See Louboutin, 696 F.3d at 228.
135. Id.
136. Id.
484
22
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 23, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 7
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol23/iss2/7
CHRISTIAN LOUBOUTIN
Louboutin, as the owner of a trademark, should have the ability to
seek protection against potential infringers whose products might
be confusingly similar.'37 In light of this, the Second Circuit
should have remanded the case so that the district court could
determine whether there was a likelihood of confusion. Had they
done so, it is possible that Louboutin would prevail.
C. Likelihood of Confusion
YSL's monochrome shoes do not have the kind of secondary
meaning that Louboutin's red sole footwear carries and consumers,
even those who participate in the high-end luxury shoe market,
would likely not recognize them as a YSL product. A red sole
clearly identifies and distinguishes the Louboutin brand in the
fashion world.' A likelihood of confusion analysis in this case
not only would have been appropriate based on the Second
Circuit's decision in Rescuecom but would have, based on the
facts, possibly resulted in a finding in favor of Louboutin.
In order to determine if there is a "likelihood of confusion,"
courts in the Second Circuit look to the Polaroid factors which
include: (1) the strength of the mark; (2) the degree of similarity
between the two marks; (3) the competitive proximity of the
products; (4) the likelihood that the prior owner will bridge the gap
between the products; (5) actual confusion; (6) the defendant's
good faith in adopting its own mark; (7) the quality of defendant's
product; and (8) the sophistication of the buyers.'3 9 Each Polaroid
factor must be considered in the context of the other factors, and
no single factor is dispositive of the likelihood of confusion.'40
As to the first factor, the "strength of the mark" refers to its
ability to identify the source of the good being sold. 4 ' In
evaluating this factor, courts look to the distinctiveness of the
137. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114,1125.
138. Louboutin, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 448.
139. Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elec. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir.
1961).
140. Id.
141. Brennan's, Inc. v. Brennan's Rest., LLC, 360 F.3d 125, 130 (2d Cir.
2004).
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mark, both its inherent distinctiveness and the distinctiveness it
acquired in the marketplace.142  The court acknowledged the
mark's distinctiveness in its secondary meaning analysis and noted
that the mark is recognized by consumers who participate in the
women's luxury footwear market, and has thereby acquired the
requisite distinctiveness worthy of trademark protection under the
Lanham Act.143
The degree of similarity between the mark and the infringing
product turns on the answer to two separate questions: (1) whether
the similarity is likely to cause confusion and (2) what effect the
similarity has upon purchasers.1' While the YSL shoes are
monochromatic, there is an obvious similarity between the
Louboutin and YSL shoes: the red outsole. Beyond that obvious
similarity, both designers have placed the red outsole on high-end
women's heels and both outsoles are an identical or nearly
identical shade of the color red. The two products create a similar
impression on the consumer, thereby contributing to a likelihood
of confusion.
The third factor, proximity in the marketplace, refers to the
extent to which the two products compete with each other in the
marketplace.'4 5 This factor weighs highly in favor of Louboutin.
Both Louboutin and YSL are luxury women's fashion designers
whose target market is affluent women, including celebrity
consumers. The price of their products, and more specifically their
shoes, is comparable thereby making their target consumer the
same wealthy, fashionable woman.
The likelihood that the prior owner will bridge the gap between
the products involves a determination of the likelihood that the
plaintiff, in this case Louboutin, will enter the defendant's business
and that prospective customers are aware of this intention.'4 6 In the
present case, this factor does not come into play, simply because
142. Id. at 130-131.
143. Louboutin, 696 F.3d at 227.
144. Medici Classics Prods. LLC v. Medici Group LLC, 590 F. Supp. 2d
548, 554 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
145. Id. at 555.
146. Id. at 556.
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the two designers are already engaged in the same luxury women's
footwear market that targets the same customer base.
While actual confusion need not be shown to prevail, evidence
of actual confusion is highly probative of the likelihood of
confusion.147 In its opinion, the court discusses the consumer
surveys submitted by Louboutin that prove actual confusion
among consumers.148 The court refers to the surveys in order to
explain its decision to narrow the Red Sole Mark, noting that the
consumers who thought a YSL shoes was Louboutin-made did so
because of the signature red sole.149 The court, however, errs in
not considering this evidence and not engaging in a likelihood of
confusion analysis because evidence of actual confusion is "highly
probative" and would have weighed heavily in favor of Louboutin.
The next factor considers the defendant's bad faith "attempt to
exploit the goodwill and reputation of a senior user by adopting the
mark with the intent to sow confusion between two companies'
products."' There is no evidence in this case that YSL intended
to create shoes that were confusingly similar to Louboutin's. In
fact, YSL made a whole line of monochromatic shoes, the red ones
being just one of the colors designed and sold."' In addition, the
record shows that YSL has been making a line of monochromatic
shoes since the 1970s, before Louboutin established its brand
notoriety and came to be known for its Red Sole Mark. However,
a red outsole has only occasionally appeared on YSL shoes and the
last time YSL marketed an all-red shoe was in its 2008
collection.'52 YSL did not have a recognizable red sole mark any
time before Louboutin obtained trademark protection for its mark
and consumers did not associate a red outsole with the YSL brand.
However, there is no evidence that YSL used the red sole with the
intent to sow confusion and exploit Louboutin's good will. As a
147. Id.
148. Louboutin, 696 F.3d at 228. Controversy surrounding survey evidence
is beyond the scope of this article.
149. Id.
150. Medici Classics Prods., 590 F. Supp. 2d at 556 (citing Star Indus., Inc.
v. Bacardi & Co. Ltd., 412 F.3d 373, 388 (2d Cir. 2005).
151. Louboutin, 696 F.3d at 213.
152. Louboutin, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 449.
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result, this factor remains neutral in the likelihood of confusion
analysis.
The factor concerned with the quality of the defendant's product
looks to whether the plaintiffs reputation can be jeopardized
because the defendant's product is of inferior quality. The record
shows in this case that both parties' products are of high quality,
they both produce and sell luxury women's footwear and they both
charge a great amount of money for their product. In addition,
both companies carry a reputation among consumers for
manufacturing high quality products. In the present case, this
factor does not weigh in favor of either party.
The final element of the likelihood of confusion analysis is the
sophistication of the buyers.' In their analysis of this factor,
courts generally find that the more sophisticated the consumer, the
less likely they are to be misled by the similarity of the two
products.'54 In the case of Louboutin, the consumer of both
parties' products is generally sophisticated and knowledgeable in
the high-end women's designer footwear marketplace. However,
given that both parties participate in this marketplace and produce
similar products, allowing YSL to use the red outsole on its shoes
makes the two high quality, luxury products difficult to distinguish
from each other, even for consumers who are sophisticated and
familiar with the brands. Although in general, in a market with
such sophisticated consumers, this factor could weigh in favor of
YSL, in this case there is potential for the court to find that it
favors Louboutin. The sophisticated consumer who can easily see
the difference between an original and an infringing product may
not be able to make that distinction in a case where both products
are luxury high heels of high quality and high notoriety.
If a court had engaged in this analysis to determine whether
there could be a likelihood of confusion even after it limited the
Red Sole Mark, it may well have come to the conclusion that
YSL's use of the red outsole on its monochrome shoe was
infringing conduct. Many of the factors considered in the analysis
could weigh in favor of Louboutin and could have led to a
different outcome in this case.
153. Medici Classics Prods., 590 F. Supp. 2d at 557.
154. Id.
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A policy that places conduct beyond trademark law's reach
irrespective of whether that conduct creates confusion increases
consumer search costs."' Trademark laws that prevent confusion
make it easier and cheaper for consumers to locate products with
desired qualities, thereby promoting competition in the
marketplace.
V. CONCLUSION
In Louboutin, the Second Circuit properly reversed the lower
court's finding that colors are not subject to trademark protection
under the Lanham Act. Colors can be trademarked because they
can acquire secondary meaning and acquire the requisite
distinctiveness that warrants trademark protection. Based on the
evidence presented to the lower court, the Louboutin court found
that Louboutin's red sole had acquired secondary meaning insofar
as the outsole contrasts with the rest of the shoe.
However, the court then erred by concluding that YSL's
monochrome red shoe did not constitute use of the Red Sole Mark
and was therefore not infringing. The Second Circuit, in its
decision in Rescuecom, had shifted from a threshold trademark use
analysis with respect to infringement. The court said that
likelihood of confusion determinations should be considered in
conjunction with the use analysis. The Louboutin court, however,
simply ignored the likelihood of confusion that could result from
YSL's use of the red sole on its monochrome red shoe. The
Second Circuit's reinstatement of the Red Sole Mark, even after its
narrowing of the scope, should not affect the full range of
protections to which Louboutin is entitled under trademark law.
Infringement analysis is a separate question that should be
addressed through a likelihood of confusion analysis. Had the
Second Circuit remanded, and the district court entertained an
analysis of all the factors, it could easily have found that YSL's
product was infringing the Red Sole Mark.
The Second Circuit's decision marks a victory for the fashion
industry in its struggles to secure intellectual property protection.
The court's rejection of the per-se rule against single color
155. McKinney, supra note 13, at 316.
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trademarks allows producers to garner protection for distinctive
designs that have acquired secondary meaning and promotes the
ultimate goals of trademark laws. Designers such as Hermes,
Valentino and Tiffany's can hold on to the trademark registration
of their signature colors and can continue to enforce their rights on
the use of those colors. However, the more broad implications of
the Second Circuit's decision create a nebulous future for the
trademark-use doctrine and its application in infringement
analyses. Despite the Second Circuit's prior shift away from the
threshold-use analysis toward a more contextual and fact specific
likelihood of confusion determination in Rescuecom, in Louboutin,
the court has revived the threshold trademark use determination as
a way to quickly dispose of claims and avoid the important,
contextual, and fact specific examination.
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